Labor Law - Arbitration - Determination of the Question of Arbitrability Under Section 301(a) of Labor-Manabement Relations Act by Mellin, Cecil R.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 58 Issue 6 
1960 
Labor Law - Arbitration - Determination of the Question of 
Arbitrability Under Section 301(a) of Labor-Manabement Relations 
Act 
Cecil R. Mellin 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Contracts Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Cecil R. Mellin, Labor Law - Arbitration - Determination of the Question of Arbitrability Under Section 
301(a) of Labor-Manabement Relations Act, 58 MICH. L. REV. 935 (1960). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol58/iss6/13 
 
This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law 
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, 
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
1960] RECENT DECISIONS 935 
LABOR LAW-ARBITRATION-DETERMINATION OF THE QUESTION OF ARBI-
TRABILITY UNDER SECTION 301 (a) OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Acr-
Plaintiff-union brought an action under section 301 (a) of the Labor-Man-
agement Relations Act1 to compel arbitration of a grievance over the sub-
contracting of work by defendant-employer. The collective bargaining 
agreement provided that questions as to the proper interpretation or applica-
tion of any of the provisions of the agreement would be submitted to arbi-
tration and that all matters involving exclusively managerial functions were 
excluded from arbitration. The trial court held the grievance not arbi-
trable. On appeal, held, reversed. An implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealings and the fact that some private arbitrators have held that the 
conventional recognition clause by implication prohibits unrestricted em-
ployer subcontracting prevent the court from saying with positive assurance 
that the contract is not susceptible to an interpretation that covers the 
dispute. Local 1912, International Association of Machinists v. United 
States Potash Co., (10th Cir. 1959) 270 F. (2d) 496. 
There are two questions raised by an assertion that a grievance must 
be arbitrated. One, termed the "question of arbitrability," is concerned with 
the jurisdiction of the arbitrator over the grievance and requires a deter-
mination of whether defendant has promised to arbitrate the particular 
l 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1958) §185 (a). "Suits for violation of contracts be-
tween an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting 
commerce as defined in this chapter .•. may be brought in any district court of the 
United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in contro-
versy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties." 
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grievance.2 Since this determination necessitates interpretation of the con-
tract, leaving the decision to the arbitrator would be in harmony with the 
conclusion of labor law scholars that the arbitrator is better able to inter-
pret the collective bargaining contract.3 But the general rule is that it is 
for the court to decide the question of arbitrability unless the parties ex-
pressly contract otherwise.4 The second question raised in the assertion that 
a grievance must be arbitrated concerns the merits of the grievance: that is, 
whether defendant's acts are prohibited by the contract.5 The general rule 
in the federal courts is that the arbitrator should decide this question, since 
this is the intent of the parties as indicated by their promises to arbitrate 
grievances. However, two types of cases have· arisen in which this rule has 
been modified by some courts.6 The first type of case is represented by 
2 This is true so long as the duty to arbitrate arises only from contract. Excluding the 
principal case, the general rule in the federal courts has been that grievances over sub-
contracting are not arbitrable in the absence of express restrictions upon subcontracting. 
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., (5th Cir. 1959) 269 F. 
(2d) 633, cert. granted 28 U.S. I.Aw WEEK 3181 (1959); Dairy, Bakery and Food Workers 
v. Grand Rapids Milk Division, (W.D. Mich. 1958) 160 F. Supp. 34. See Local Division 
1509 v. Eastern Mass. Street Railway Co., (D.C. Mass. 1958) 162 F. Supp. 942 (dictum that 
recognition clause does not make grievance arbitrable). But see Timken Roller Bearing 
Co. v. NLRB, (6th Cir. 1947) 161 F. (2d) 949 at 955 (dictum that subcontracting grievance 
is arbitrable). State law can also be considered by the federal courts in fashioning federal 
labor law. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 at 456-457 (1957). The state 
courts generally hold the subcontracting grievance not arbitrable where there are no express 
restrictions on subcontracting. See, e.g., United Dairy Workers v. Detroit Creamery Co., 
(Mich. Cir. Ct. 1956) 30 CCH Lab. Cas. ,i70115. 
3 The peculiarities in the collective bargaining process result in a contract in which 
the rights and duties of the parties are not adequately reflected by the written words. 
As a result, interpretation is better done by a private arbitrator familiar with these pecu-
liarities, the particular industry, the parties, and their past relationships. See Cox, "Re-
flections Upon Labor Arbitration," 72 HARV. L. REv. 1482 (1959); Shulman, "Reason, Con-
tract, and Law in Labor Relations,'' 68 HARv. L. REv. 999 (1955). See also the comments 
of Judge Magruder in Local 149 v. General Electric Co., (1st Cir. 1957) 250 F. (2d) 922 at 
926-927, cert. den. 356 U.S. 938 (1957), and the articles there cited. 
4 See, e.g., principal case at 497-498; Local 201 v. General Electric Co., (1st Cir. 1959) 
262 F. (2d) 265 at 267. See, generally, 24 A.L.R. (2d) 752 at 766-767 (1952). The Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit takes the contrary view. Food Handlers Local 425 v. Pluss 
Poultry, Inc., (8th Cir. 1958) 260 F. (2d) 835. Judge Magruder has suggested two rationales 
in support of the general rule. The more doubtful is that the United States Arbitration 
Act, 9 U.S.C. (1958) §§1-14, applies and requires the court to decide this question. The 
other theory jg that since plaintiff establishes federal jurisdiction under §301 (a) by sup-
ported allegations that the refusal to arbitrate constitutes a contract violation, the court 
must find a contract violation before the relief sought can be granted. Local 149 v. General 
Electric Co., note 3 supra, at 927-930. For discussion of the status of the Arbitration Act as 
applied to collective bargaining agreements, see note, 46 CALIF. L. REv. 462 (1958). 
The general rule supports the conclusion that the court can decide whether a party 
seeking to compel arbitration has complied with the contract's procedural requirements 
for submitting a grievance to arbitration. Local 19322 v. American Brass Co., (7th Cir. 
1959) 28 U.S. I.Aw WEEK 2322 (1960); Boston Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Insurance Agents' 
Intl. Union, (1st Cir. 1958) 258 F. (2d) 516. 
5 The general rule in the federal and state courts is that subcontracting does not con-
stitute a violation of the contract where there are no express restrictions on subcontracting. 
See 57 A.L.R. (2d) 1399 (1958). See also note 12 infra. 
6 There are also problems involving judicial intervention in the arbitration process 
after the arbitrator has made an award. In Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp. v. United 
Steelworkers of America, (4th Cir. 1959) 269 F. (2d) 327, cert. granted 28 U.S. I.Aw WEEK 
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United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., where the court 
decided that the grievance was arbitrable under the arbitration clause of the 
contract, but refused to compel arbitration because the grievance was 
"frivolous."7 While the court's emphasis in reaching this conclusion was on 
evaluating the sufficiency of the facts alleged in support of the merits of 
plaintiffs grievance, dismissal of the grievance as frivolous indicates that 
the court had also arrived at some interpretation of the contract provisions 
which regulated this kind of grievance.8 Both the view that the arbitrator 
is a better interpreter of the collective bargaining agreement and the idea 
that the parties intended the arbitrator to decide the merits compel the 
conclusion that this was an unjustified encroachment upon the arbitrator's 
function of deciding the merits. Opposed to this, the Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit has. held that a grievance does not cease to be arbi-
trable even though the result on the merits is clear under the contract.9 
The second type of case is represented by United Steelworkers of America v. 
Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co.,1° where the court, in deciding that a 
grievance over subcontracting was not arbitrable, also became involved in 
contract interpretations which would determine the merits of the grievance. 
However, given the rule that the court must decide whether defendant has 
promised to arbitrate the particular grievance, it appears that the particular 
arbitration provisions of the contract forced the court to decide the merits 
question. The contract provided that matters which were strictly a function 
of management were not subject to arbitration. Whether the grievance was 
3207 (1960), the union sought to compel management to comply with an arbitration award 
ordering reinstatement of wrongfully discharged employees and reimbursement for lost 
wages. The contract had terminated before the award was made and had not been renewed. 
The court modified the award by omitting the requirements of reinstatement and reim-
bursement for wages lost after the contract had terminated, on the theory that these rights 
of the employees remained in force only for the life of the contract. 
7 (6th Cir. 1959) 264 F. (2d) 624, cert. granted 28 U.S. LAw WEEK 3148 (1959). This 
represents an adoption of the Cutler-Hammer doctrine, wherein a court, before compelling 
arbitration, must find not only that defendant promised to arbitrate the particular dispute 
but also that there is a bona fide dispute. Intl. Assn. of Machinists v. Cutler-Hammer, 271 
App. Div. 917, 67 N.Y.S. (2d) 317 (1947), affd. per curiam 297 N.Y. 519, 74 N.E. (2d) 464 
(1947). See 24 A.L.R. (2d) 752 at 762-764 (1952); note, 10 SYRACUSE L. REv. 278 (1959). 
8 A partial justification for this decision on the merits would be that the court was 
construing the contract most strongly in plaintiff's favor but that plaintiff was still unable 
to state a good claim. 
9 New Bedford Defense Products Div. v. Local No. 1113, (1st Cir. 1958) 258 F. (2d) 522. 
10 Note 2 supra. The task of the court was complicated by unclear drafting. The 
contract provided that there were to be no lockouts, that certain matters were exclusively 
within the jurisdiction of management provided that there was no discrimination against 
union employees, and that exclusively-management functions were not subject to arbitra-
tion. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., (S.D. Ala. 
1958) 168 F. Supp. 702. Since the union alleged that the subcontracting was discriminatory 
and that it effected a partial lockout, the court, besides deciding that subcontracting was 
within the clause excluding management functions from arbitration, also had to decide 
whether such clause was qualified by the discrimination and lockout clauses. The ruling 
that management functions were exempted absolutely from arbitration would mean that 
the union might successfully prove to the court a violation of the lockout provision by use 
of a management function and yet get no arbitration on the matter. 
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arbitrable depended upon whether subcontracting was strictly a manage-
ment function, which in tum depended upon whether there were any ex.-
press or implied restrictions on subcontracting. But whether the union was 
right on the merits of the grievance also depended on whether there were 
any express or implied restrictions on subcontracting.11 The arbitration 
provisions in the principal case were similar to those in Warrior and Gulf. 
To decide whether a grievance over subcontracting was arbitrable, the 
court would have to decide whether subcontracting was an exclusive manage-
rial function; and to answer this question the court would have to make 
contract interpretations which would decide the merits of the grievance. 
The court held that the differences of opinion among the courts and arbi-
trators as to whether restrictions on subcontracting should be implied from 
the conventional recognition clause were enough to make the grievance 
arbitrable, but it was careful not to rule that there were any such restric-
tions.12 This result appears to be the desirable one, being in line with 
scholars' suggestions that the arbitrator is a better interpreter of the collec-
tive bargaining contract, and with the idea that the parties intended the 
arbitrator to decide the merits. However, given the rule that the court must 
decide the question of arbitrability,13 it is difficult to justify this result in 
legal theory. In not deciding whether subcontracting was restricted, the 
court did not decide whether it was an exclusive managerial function, and 
therefore did not really decide that defendant had promised to arbitrate 
this grievance. The court in effect held that defendant possibly promised 
to arbitrate this grievance. 
A proposed statute by the National Academy of Arbitrators would solve 
this problem by allowing the arbitrator to decide both the question of arbi-
trability and the merits of the grievance, with judicial review of the arbitra-
tor's determination of the question of arbitrability.14 A party seeking to 
11 The court in Engineers Assn. v. Sperry Gyroscope Co., (2d Cir. 1957) 251 F. (2d) 
133, cert. den. 356 U.S. 932 (1957), faced a similar problem. 
12 The private arbitration cases provide a rich source of concepts. The arbitrators 
are split on whether subcontracting is prohibited by the contract in absence of express 
restrictions. See Bethlehem Steel Co., 30 Lab. Arb. Rep. 678 at 682 (1958) for a citation of 
cases. See National Tube Co., 17 Lab. Arb. Rep. 790 at 793 (1951) for a theory restricting 
subcontracting by implication from the recognition clause. 
13 The court in the principal case appears to approve of the rule. Principal case at 
497-498. 
14 The court is to decide the question of arbitrability when the contract expressly so 
provides. Draft 3, proposed United States Labor Arbitration Act, National Academy of 
Arbitrators. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has judicially promulgated the 
same rule. Food Handlers Local 425 v. Pluss Poultry, Inc., note 4 supra. Compare the 
Uniform Arbitration Act, §2, which also eliminates the use of the Cutler-Hammer doctrine. 
9 ULA 79 (1957). Minnesota adopted the Uniform Act in 1957. Minn. Stat. Ann. (1947; 
Supp. 1959) §§572.08-572.30. 
Section 13 (3) of the statute proposed by the N.A.A. authorizes the court to vacate an 
award "to the extent that the award is affected by the arbitrator's determination of an 
issue which he has no jurisdiction to determine .•.. The award shall not be vacated if there 
was a reasonable basis for the arbitrator's determination, express or implicit, of his 
jurisdiction." In a Warrior and Gulf-type case, where the determinations of the merits 
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compel arbitration would have to prove only the existence of a general 
promise to arbitrate grievances and would not have to prove further that the 
promise to arbitrate encompasses the particular grievance. In the absence 
of such a statute, the principal case can be regarded as standing for the 
proposition that where a court in deciding the question of arbitrability 
finds itself involved with contract interpretations which would also deter-
mine the merits, the court must compel arbitration and allow the arbitrator 
to decide both questions.11• 
Cecil R. Mellin 
and of jurisdiction overlap, in theory the arbitrator could decide on the merits that sub-
contracting was a violation of the contract, and the court could decide that the arbitrator 
had no jurisdiction because subcontracting was not restricted by the contract. Query 
whether the court should review the arbitrator's determination of his jurisdiction in such 
a case. This problem would have to be considered under both the proposed statute and 
the rule promulgated by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. 
115 This is similar to the position of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, 
except for that court's provision for judicial review of the arbitrator's determination of the 
question of arbitrability. Food Handlers Local 425 v. Pluss Poultry, Inc., note 4 supra. 
